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.Voting Your (Home)values: an Empirical Assessment of Homeownership and Voting Patterns
in Seattle
Carter Morfitt (advised by Dr. Reid Dorsey-Palmateer)
Motivation
Over the course of my studies in politics and economics at Western Washington
University, I have become more and more intrigued by the question of the political economy of
local policymaking. Clearly, as major metropolitan areas face worsening crises of housing
affordability and scholars and policymakers reckon with how to build communities resilient to
the environmental challenges of the 21st century, the subject merits consideration. However, in
my undergraduate classes, I often found that the process of policy selection and implementation
was absent from discussions of public policy. When policymakers were mentioned in
undergraduate-level discussions, their choices were generally taken as a given, as external inputs
to an economic system rather than as products of a political economic system. These approaches
never satisfied my interdisciplinary sensibilities: after all, if economists are to offer policy
prescriptions, it seems naïve to do so without consideration for the political forces that will affect
the likelihood of their passage and the shape of their implementation. Politics and economics, I
believe, are too tightly interwoven for either to ignore the other without risk. So, for my honors
thesis, I set out to find an interdisciplinary model for policymaking at the municipal level and put
it to the test.
The Homevoter Hypothesis
I found my model in the so-called “homevoter hypothesis”, first proposed by Dartmouth
Economist William A. Fischel. Fischel has long maintained that homeowners represent a crucial
force at the local level of our democratic process. By his reasoning, the impact local
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governments’ decisions have on property values motivate homeowners to actively participate in
local government in order to protect their homes’ values (Carruthers, 2002, 785). The idea makes
intuitive sense: as The New York Times wrote in 2018, most city dwellers can tell tales of
homeowners from both parties who oppose new developments in their area that might lower their
property values, and “do so in spite of their own ideologies — whether conservative voters might
otherwise value free markets, or whether liberals value policies that aid the poor” (Badger and
Bui, 2019). It also has a foundation in well-established economics scholarship: research shows
that local public services are, indeed, capitalized into home values. A go-to example is
education: in 2011 literature review, Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger find that “Almost all of the
review studies find evidence that school quality, especially as measured by test scores, is
capitalized into house values” (46). Despite differing data sets and methodological approaches,
the examined studies show that house values increase by 1-4% in when student test scores in an
area increase by one standard deviation (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011, 46). This, of course,
does not amount for direct support for the homevoter hypothesis. However, as I began reading
further into the subject, I found that recent research on a dataset of Ohio voters by Andrew B.
Hall and Jesse Yoder (2019) suggests that homeowners, do, indeed, participate in local elections
at significantly higher levels than non-homeowners (2).
The homevoter hypothesis, therefore, seemed worth consideration. Happily, I discovered
that, throughout the 2000s, several studies empirically tested the homevoter hypothesis. Brunner
et al. (2001) consider a 1993 California initiative that would have subsidized private schools
through a voucher program, hypothesizing that homeowners in good public school districts
would consider the initiative a threat to their home values and thus vote against it (517). They
find that voters in good public school districts were significantly less likely to support the school
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voucher initiative than those in bad public school districts, although they could not conclude
whether those results were more attributable to the initiative’s perceived threat to home values or
to a perception that the initiative was a referendum on local public schools (531). Brunner aims
to address this issue in a follow-up paper, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), which conducted a
similar analysis of a 2000 California school voucher initiative, a vote that they had more data on,
having gained access to a survey of California voters in the 2000 election (531). In this study,
they pay particular attention to homeowning families without school children. If such families
were more likely to vote against the voucher initiative in school districts with public schools that
provided a significant boost to property values than renters, they reason, it would amount to
significant support for the homevoter hypothesis; this is, in fact, what they observed (254).
Later in the decade, Dehring et al. (2008) test the homevoter hypothesis using a 2004
Arlington, Texas, referendum on the installation of a publicly subsidized football stadium. The
stadium was projected to lower land values near the chosen site but raise land values past a
certain distance from it. For every $1000 increase in housing prices, Dehring et al. (2008) find
between a 0.9% and a 1.2% increase in support for the stadium project and a 1.0% decrease in
voter turnout (168); not only were districts where home values were negatively impacted more
likely to vote against the stadium project, but they were also more likely to turn up to the polls.
The homevoter hypothesis’s predictions were borne out. Glaeser and Ward’s (2009) results from
Greater Boston, too, provide some indirect support. They find that land price in an area is
negatively associated with the amount of development in that area, suggesting more limits on
supply in higher-value areas (Glaeser and Ward, 2009, 268). This seems to fit the homevoter
hypothesis: households in such areas might be supporting land-use restrictions in order to keep
the prices of their homes high. Finally, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) conduct their inquiry
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on a larger scale, developing a homevoter model for land use regulations—“In the model, owners
of developed residential land favor additional land use constraints as this raises the price of their
land; owners of undeveloped land oppose such tightening because it increases the cost of
development” (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013, 29)—and comparing that model’s predictions
with observations from U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas from across the country. They find
that their homevoter model is consistent with the empirical evidence (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud,
2013, 41). It seems, then, that a homevoter effect may well play a major role in affecting
municipalities’ voting patterns.
My Study: Choice of Subject and Data Gathering
After discovering and reading through the above literature, I was confident that the
homevoter hypothesis would make for an interesting, and fruitful, topic of study. I eventually
settled on a subject inspired by Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), Dehring et al. (2008), and Hilber
and Robert-Nicoud (2013). As Brunner and Sonstelie did, I decided that, rather than examining
voting on a municipal project or candidate, I would consider support for a state-level initiative
that could have a (perceived) impact on the provision of education: Washington State Initiative
1240, passed in 2012, which allowed 40 charter schools to open across Washington over the
following five years. However, unlike Brunner and Sonstelie, I lacked access to statewide data
on voters’ household characteristics. Instead, I focused on a particular municipality for which I
could obtain both voting and household data: the City of Seattle. I obtained 2012 general election
voting data for Seattle from the King County Elections website. As for my household data, I
drew on a U.S. census bureau dataset, as Dehring et al. and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud did:
specifically, I used estimates from the 2013 American Communities Survey for Seattle (City of
Seattle).
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Finding my datasets was easy: parsing them took significantly more effort. To my
disappointment, I discovered that voting precincts and census precincts do not line up. Moreover,
precise information on precinct boundaries was not readily available: in order to compare my
King County Elections and Census Bureau data, I had to print out maps of the each of Seattle’s
City Council districts and manually compare the boundaries of precincts with the boundaries of
the five Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) that make up Seattle; comparing
at the census precinct level would have meant far too many voting precincts bisected, and
therefore impossible to enter into my database.

My workspace as I went through each of Seattle’s voting precincts one-by-one and entered them into my database.

Even making the compromises I did make, I still had to eliminate dozens of voting
precincts from my dataset. Many were bisected by PUMA boundaries, and many others were not
present in my King County Elections dataset. The total number of eliminated voting precincts
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was small relative to the total number of voting precincts in Seattle, but even so, it is plausible
that their elimination, while necessary in order to conduct my study, could have had a
distortionary effect on my results. In any case, once I had sorted and entered all my data, I was
left with a dataset that had voting and demographic data for each of Seattle’s PUMAs. My
sample size was winnowed down to five data points—workable, but far from ideal.
Analysis
With my dataset assembled, I ran a series of single and multiple regressions that
attempted to assess the viability of a PUMA’s homeownership rate as a predictor of its voting
and turnout in the 2012 general election. My two single linear regression models comparing
owner occupancy rates with voting and turnout, were statistically insignificant, with the F-test
for model significance returning p-values of 0.343 and 0.499, respectively.

Owner occupancy rate vs yes share of vote on Initiative 1240
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Owner occupancy rate vs participation in 2012 general election

Once I added in median home value—a proxy for the quality of nearby schools, since areas with
higher quality schools should, based on the research discussed earlier, tend to see higher home
values—as an additional explanatory variable, the significance of my model for the yes share of
the vote on Initiative 1240 improved dramatically, with an F-test p-value of 0.196, and
coefficient p-values of 0.104 for owner occupancy rate and 0.151 for median home value; hardly
rock-solid statistical significance, but not bad at all given the small size of my sample. Moreover,
as expected under the homevoter hypothesis, both predictors were negatively associated with yes
votes on Initiative 1240: in particular, a 1 percent increase in owner occupancy in an area was
correlated with a roughly 0.4 percent decrease in support for Initiative 1240.
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Owner occupancy rate and median home value vs yes share of vote on Initiative 1240

However, my multiple regression model comparing owner occupancy and median home value
with participation in the 2012 election returned a p-value of 0.487 for the F-test.

Owner occupancy rate and median home value vs participation in 2012 general election
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Moreover, when I added the share of households with a resident under 18 years of age into my
multiple regression model for the yes share of the vote on Initiative 1240, the model’s
significance plummeted, returning a p-value of 0.537 for the F-test and a p-value of 0.714 for the
significance of the owner occupancy rate as a predictor.

Owner occupancy rate, median home value, and share of households with one or more resident under 18 years of
age vs yes share of vote on Initiative 1240

Suspecting high multicollinearity between the owner occupancy rate and the share of households
with one or more resident under 18 years of age, I ran a regression directly comparing the owner
occupancy rate with the share of households with one or more resident under 18 years of age,
and found that they were very highly correlated, with the F-test returning a p-value of 0.001.
This, combined with the fact that a multiple linear regression model comparing the share of
households with one or more residents under 18 years of age and median home value with the
yes share of the vote on Initiative 1240 had very similar significance and coefficients to my
model comparing the owner occupancy rate and median home value with the yes share of the
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vote on Initiative 1240, means that I am unable to support the notion that owner occupancy rate
is a uniquely worthwhile predictor for support of Initiative 1240 relative to simpler demographic
measures.

Owner occupancy rate vs share of households with one or more residents under 18 years of age

Share of households with one or more residents under 18 years of age and median home value vs yes share of vote
on Initiative 1240
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Conclusion
While the unfortunate limitations of my dataset, discovered too late into my research
process to be addressed without restarting it entirely, mean that none of my results amount to
definitive support for one conclusion or another, I was still able to find some support for one of
the key predictions of the homevoter hypothesis: particularly, that a higher homeownership rate
and higher home values in a given PUMA was negatively correlated with support for Initiative
1240’s charter school program, which could be perceived as a threat to home values. However, I
was unable to find support for its other main prediction—that a PUMA’s homeownership rate
would be positively correlated with its overall participation level in the 2012 election—nor was I
able to demonstrate the worth of homeownership as a predictor of voting behavior compared to a
simple demographic predictor.
The limitations of my dataset were the single most important source of problems in this
study. Were I to conduct future research on a similar ballot measure, it would probably be
necessary to find household-level data that covers both demographics and voting intentions, as
Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) did, so I could focus on childless homeowners and renters and thus
more directly assess the homevoter effect. Lacking that data, I would likely need to conduct a
survey to obtain it myself.
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